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In recent quarters, the U.S. banking system has rapidly 
improved its capital  strength.  Motivated by strategic 
business opportunities and regulatory pressures, bank 
holding companies now appear to be targeting capital 
ratios well above the minimums set by regulation. The 
current drive for capital is apparently being rewarded  by 
private investors: those bank holding companies that 
have significantly increased their capital ratios, particu- 
larly those that began from  initially  low levels,  have 
experienced large appreciations in their stock prices. 
This  article tracks  three important capital-to-asset 
ratios  for the banking  system: 1)  the leverage ratio 
(book value of tangible equity  to total assets), 2) the tier 
1  risk-based ratio (tangible equity to total risk-adjusted 
assets), and 3) the  total—that is, tier  1 plus tier  2—risk- 
based  ratio  (tangible equity plus  secondary  capital 
instruments to total risk-adjusted assets). We identify 
the broad changes that have taken place in  these ratios 
over an eighteen-month period and the reasons for the 
improvement in capital measures. Central to this effort 
is  an examination of the various actions taken by bank 
holding companies to boost their capital  ratios.  We 
analyze the relationship between these  'strategies'— 
all moves to raise capital or shrink assets—and the 
rewards assigned to them by the stock market. 
The evidence suggests that, as a simple accounting 
matter, almost all of the aggregate improvement in the 
leverage ratio has been due to equity growth, mostly 
through stock issuance. The risk-based capital  ratios 
have risen even more than the leverage ratio because 
risk-weighted assets have declined more sharply than 
total assets as banks have curtailed  loan growth and 
purchased securities. These aggregate trends mask dif- 
terences in the strategies adopted by individual bank 
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holding companies to improve their capital ratios.  For 
example, institutions with initially low capital ratios and 
weak public bond ratings have reduced their assets or 
slowed their  acquisition of  assets much more than other 
bank holding companies. 
Our  analysis of the stock  market response to the 
various methods of improving capital ratios shows that 
different strategies have  garnered different rewards.  For 
bank holding companies that were well capitalized at 
the beginning of the sample period, stock price appre- 
ciation  was more highly  correlated with capital  ratio 
improvements achieved through  capital  growth  than 
with improvements  through asset reduction. For weakly 
capitalized institutions, however, the stock market 
appears to have rewarded capital  growth  and  asset 
shrinkage  about equally. For  all institutions, we find that 
stock prices responded in about the same proportion to 
a reduction in total assets  as to a decline in  risk- 
weighted assets. Of the various ways that companies 
increased capital, increases in earnings were, not sur- 
prisingly,  associated with  the  largest stock  price 
increases. Nevertheless, building capital by other meth- 
ods, such as limiting dividends and issuing stock, also 
appears to have been rewarded by the stock market. 
Background  on the current capital regulations1 
Banks and  bank  holding companies are  required to 
meet minimum capital standards calculated on both a 
simple leverage basis and a risk-adjusted basis. The 
IFurther elaboration can be found in the testimonies of William 
Taylor. late Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
and Jerome Powell, Under Secretary for Finance. Department of the 
Treasury, given at the hearings on "Capital Standards and Credit 
Availability," House Committee  on Small Business, July 9. 1992. leverage standard  specifies  that a certain  minimum 
amount of tangible equity be held against total assets. 
The  risk-based standard is more complex, incorporating 
both equity and other forms of capital and measuring 
both assets and off-balance sheet exposures on a risk- 
adjusted basis. The  current capital guidelines for banks 
and  bank  holding  companies were adopted in early 
1989 (with certain  interim rules effective at year-end 
1990 and  final rules effective as of  year-end 1992).2 The 
risk-based  guidelines  are  based on  an  international 
agreement called the Basle Accord, negotiated by bank 
regulators from  the major industrialized countries under 
the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements 
in Basle, Switzerland. 
Under  the risk-based standard, risk weights are 
assigned to different asset categories. Cash and U.S. 
government securities are  given zero risk weight; 
municipal securities, federal agency securities,  and 
interbank obligations, a 20 percent risk weight. Loans 
(first liens only) secured by residential real estate are 
assigned a 50 percent risk weight. Other assets, includ- 
ing most consumer and business loans, are given a risk 
weighting of 100 percent. In addition, credit equivalen- 
cies  assigned to off-balance-sheet activities such as 
loan commitments, letters of credit, and swaps are risk 
weighted and added to the risk-adjusted assets on the 
balance sheet to arrive at total risk-weighted assets. 
As  of year-end 1992, all banks  and  bank  holding 
companies will be required to maintain tier 1 capital, 
essentially tangible common equity  and most preferred 
stock,  in excess of 4 percent of risk-weighted assets. 
The risk-based standards also define a broader mea- 
sure of capital, total capital, which combines tier 1 with 
tier 2 capital. The latter  designation applies primarily to 
subordinated  debt,  mandatory convertible  securities, 
and loan loss reserves (up to a maximum of 1.25 per- 
cent of risk-weighted assets). In addition to satisfying 
the tier  1 capital requirement, banks and bank holding 
companies must maintain total capital in excess of 8 
percent of risk-weighted assets. 
The leverage ratio requirement was designed to sup- 
plement the risk-based capital framework established 
under the Basle Accord. As originally formulated, the 
risk-based system principally addressed broad catego- 
ries of credit risk associated with particular depository 
institution  assets and off-balance-sheet activities rather 
than  interest  rate risks and  other noncredit  banking 
risks. The leverage ratio was intended to compensate 
for these gaps in the risk-based capital requirements. 
The  leverage ratio is defined as the ratio  of  tier 1 capital 
2The guidelines for bank holding companies and state-chartered 
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System  are laid out 
in the "Capital Adequacy Guidelines," 12 CFR 208, appendix A, 
and 12 CFR 225, appendixes A and B. 
to average tangible assets. The  minimum leverage ratio 
requirement for individual banks and bank holding com- 
panies varies with their examination ratings and activi- 
ties and with other factors. Under current regulations, a 
bank or bank holding company may maintain a leverage 
ratio as low as 3 percent if the institution  is in very 
sound condition  and not experiencing or anticipating 
significant growth. As a practical matter, minimum lever- 
age ratios for most institutions are  about 4 to 5 
percent.3 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve- 
ment Act of 1991 (FDICIA) requires that bank regulators 
publish interest rate risk regulations by June 1993.On 
July 31,  1992, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the 
Controller of the Currency jointly put forward for public 
comment a proposal incorporating interest risk in the 
risk-based capital standards. The agencies have stated 
that they may lower or eliminate the leverage capital 
requirement once interest rate risk is included in the 
risk-based capital framework.4 
Banks and bank holding companies have strong regu- 
latory incentives to maintain capital levels in excess of 
the required minimums. Regulators require that banks 
and bank holding companies experiencing or anticipat- 
ing rapid growth maintain capital ratios well above the 
stated minimums.  Moreover,  to implement section 131 of 
FDICIA, regulators have recently refined the existing 
capital standards to recognize different degrees of cap- 
ital strength. In particular, specific capital "zones" have 
been adopted by bank regulators for use in (1) deter- 
mining eligibility  for brokered deposits, (2) setting risk- 
based premiums for deposit insurance, and (3) prompt- 
ing corrective regulatory actions.  Under this scheme, 
banks  are assigned to capital  adequacy  groups  as 
follows:5 
Well capitalized:  The bank's tier 1  risk-based ratio is 
greater than  6  percent, total risk-based  ratio  is 
greater than  10  percent,  and  leverage  ratio  is 
greater than 5 percent. 
3See the testimonies of  William Taylor and Jerome Powell on "Capital 
Standards and Credit Availability." Regulations require a 3 percent 
minimum leverage ratio for banks with the highest examination 
ratings: however, the minimum capital ratio is 100 to 200 basis 
points higher for most other institutions. The appropriateness of a 
bank's leverage ratio is reviewed by its primary regulator. 
4See the testimonies of William Taylor and Jerome Powell on "Capital 
Standards and Credit Availability." 
5See, for example, "Proposals to Implement Prompt Corrective 
Actions for Undercapitalized State Member Banks," Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, Circular no. 10552, July 13, 1992. 
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less than 4 percent, total risk-based ratio is less 
than 8 percent, or leverage ratio is  less than 4 
percent.7 
Adequately capitalized:  The bank is neither well cap- 
italized nor undercapitalized. 
In the discussion  below, we sometimes combine the 
adequately capitalized and undercapitalized bank hold- 
ing companies into a single "weakly capitalized" group. 
Recent changes in the aggregate  capital ratios  and 
balance sheets 
Our analysis focuses primarily on bank holding compa- 
nies rather than banks, even though both are subject to 
the same minimum capital requirements.8  We concen- 
trate on the holding companies for three reasons. First, 
bank holding companies generally make and execute 
the key financing  decisions for the banks, including 
decisions about dividend policy  and capital market issu- 
ance. Second, because bank holding companies have 
some flexibility to transfer capital from one subsidiary to 
another, the consolidated  strength of a bank holding 
company may  be the best  measure of the long-run 
capital  strength  of any individual  subsidiary  bank.° 
Third, bank holding companies issue most of the pub- 
licly traded stock of U.S. banking organizations. 
Our basic sample consists of all bank holding compa- 
nies with assets greater than $150 million that reported 
risk-based capital and assets in the FR Y-9C reports 
filed with the Federal Reserve for September 30, 1990. 
This is the first date that bank holding companies were 
required to report  risk-weighted assets. (A few small 
institutions did not comply and had to be dropped from 
the sample.) The most recent data available to us are 
for the reporting  period  ending March 31,  1992. 
•This definition of undercapitalized includes the banks defined in the 
regulations as  significantly undercapitalized'  and "critically 
undercapitalized.' 
'Banks  that have the highest examination ratings and are not 
experiencing or anticipating significant growth are not 
undercapitalized if they maintain a leverage ratio in excess of 
3 percent. 
STo date, the various capital zones adopted in connection with 
FDICIA apply only to banks. We have chosen to apply these zones 
to bank holding companies only for the purposes of our analysis. 
•Bank holding companies are discouraged by their regulators and 
the credit rating agencies from  excessive 'double leverage,' that 
is, from downstreaming significantly more equity to their 
subsidiaries than they have in equity on a parent-only basis. 
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Altogether, the sample comprised 1082 bank holding 
companies in the beginning of  the period and 983  at the 
end. 
Consolidation within the industry has been very rapid. 
A total of ninety-nine bank holding companies (9.1 per- 
cent of sample) with $237 billion in assets (7.9  percent 
of  the sample) "exited" by March 31, 1992 (that is, they 
did not file a FR Y-9C report for that date). Most exiting 
bank holding companies either merged with other  bank 
holding  companies  or  were  closed  by  the  Federal 
Deposit  Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  Bank holding 
companies that exited through merger are part of the 
sample at the  start  of  the  period  and, in a  sense, remain 
in  the  sample at the end  because their assets  and 
capital appear on the balance sheet of an acquirer.  The 
consolidation process is continuing: numerous mergers 
have been effected since March 31, 1992, and others 
are being planned.1° 
In general, the holding companies in the sample sub- 
stantially strengthened  their capital  ratios  over the 
eighteen-month  period (Table 1). Specific improvements 
included a 1.4 percentage point rise in the tier 1  risk- 
based capital ratio, a 1.8 percentage point rise in the 
total risk-based capital ratio, and a  0.7 percentage point 
rise in the tier  1 leverage ratio. Underlying the improve- 
ments in the capital  ratios were strong tier 1  capital 
growth  (12.1  percent), slightly negative asset  growth 
(—1.2 percent), and shrinkage of risk-weighted assets 
(—7.8 percent).  The composition  of assets  shifted 
toward those with low risk weights. Holdings of securi- 
'OWe did not attempt to construct pro forma combinations as of 
September 30, 1990. for bank holding companies that merged 
before March 31, 1992, because such combinations obscure the 
fact that weak bank holding companies are being absorbed by the 
strong. In most cases, the acquirer must raise additional equity 
following a merger to  maintain its initial capital ratios. In this sense, 
mergers are similar to other forms of asset growth in that they 
absorb capital.  Moreover,  each merger is different and pro forma 
combinations mask the differences. For example, in a merger of 
"equals,' the bank holding company designated the acquirer may 
not need to raise any additional capital to maintain its earlier 
capital ratios after the merger, whereas in an FDIC-assisted  merger. 
the bank holding company targeted for acquisition has no equity 
and the acquiring bank holding company will probably need to 
issue new equity. 
Large mergers during the period analyzed include Chemical/ 
Manufacturers  (assets, $66 billion), Nationsbank (NCNB)/C&S- 
Sovran ($50 billion). Fleet/Bank of New England ($23 billion),  First 
Union/Southeast  ($15 billion), Society/Ameritrust ($11 billion), 
Wachovia/South  Carolina National ($7 billion). Norwest/Uniled Banks 
of Colorado. ($6 billion), and ABN Amro/European  American ($5 
billion). The mergers of Bank of America/Security Pacific ($73 
billion), Comerica/Manufaclurers  .  National ($14  billion), and Bank 
One/Valley  National ($11 billion) were not completed as of March 
31, 1992. The sample does not include the 160 bank holding 
companies with $46 billion in assets that filed FR Y-9C reports for 
March 31. 1992, but not for September 30. 1990. Many of these are 
newly formed bank holding companies. In general, the entrants 
have better than average capital  ratios. (One entrant is a $6 billion 
credit card company, MBNA. which was spun off to private 
investors by MNC Financial during the sample period.) ties rose sharply  (16.9 percent), while loans fell (—7.0 
percent)."  On a risk-weighted basis, off-balance-sheet 
items shrank  (—13.1 percent)  more rapidly than  on- 
balance-sheet  items  (—6.6 percent). Among the  off- 
balance-sheet items, foreign exchange and interest rate 
contracts declined (—7.2 percent, on a risk-adjusted 
basis),'2 but less sharply than other off-balance-sheet 
"Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve  System, "Senior Loan 
Officer Survey on Bank Lending Practices,  August 1992, reports 
the explanations given by loan officers for their banks' decision to 
increase securities holdings over the last two and one-half years. 
Among the fifty-nine respondents, thirty-five indicated that securities 
offered greater profits, thirteen emphasized the uncertain economic 
outlook, eleven cited a need to fund anticipated increases in loan 
demand, nine stressed a desire to improve their risk-based capital 
ratios, and nine gave other reasons. (Banks were allowed more than 
one answer.) 
'2lhis decline  was due to a decrease in the replacement value of 
outstanding foreign exchange contracts. The replacement values of 
interest rate contracts and the notional values of both interest rate 
and foreign exchange contracts continued to rise  throughout the 
sample period. Moreover, the aggregate risk-weighted amount of 
swaps could be volatile: mostly flat over the sample, the amount of 
swaps spiked  upwards on December 31, 1991. 
Table  1 
items (—13.8 percent) such as unused loan commit- 
ments and letters of credit. Nonperforming assets rose 
19.0 percent, a rate  faster than the growth in loan loss 
reserves (3.4 percent). Although bank holding compa- 
flies with  low tier 1  capital  ratios were probably  not 
reserving aggressively, loan loss reserve growth may 
also have been weak because over half of all reserves 
do not qualify as tier 2 capital (qualifying reserves are 
limited to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets accord- 
ing to the final year-end 1992 rules). 
The  changes in equity  and supplemental capital com- 
ponents for bank holding companies that filed FR Y-9C 
reports both at the beginning and end of the sample 
period are recorded in Table 2. Here we see the  compo- 
nents of capital  growth,  including  net income,  divi- 
dends,  capital  market issuance, and  equity acquired 
through mergers. Equity is acquired through a merger 
when a  bank holding company assumes both the assets 
and liabilities of another financial institution.13  To raise 
'3The different methods of accounting for equity acquired through 
mergers are discussed in William LeCates, "Accounting for Bank 
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Assets and Capital_of  sank HoldIng Companies  Reporting for 1990-UI 
Level Change  September 30, 1990  March 31, 1992 
Capital ratios (percent) 
Tier 1 risk-based ratio  6.5  7.9  1.4 
Total  risk-based ratio  9.5  11.3  1.8 
Leverage ratio  5.5  6.2  0.7 
Number of bank holding companies  1082  983  —99 
Billions of Dollars  Billions of Dollars  Percent Change 
Notes: The sample consists of  all bank holding companies wIth assets greater than $150  million that filed FR Y-9C reports, including reports 
of  risk-weighted assets, for  1990-Ill. The sample includes the  ninety-nine bank holding companies  with $237  billion in assets that "exited" 
before 1992-I,  mostly through mergers or regulatory closures. The sample does not  irciude  the  160 bank holding companies  with $46 billion 
in assets that filed Y-9C reports in 1992-I but  not  in 1990-Ill.  Many of  these. are newly  formed bank holding companies. 
tThe decline in swap-related  risk-based assets is  due to  a drop in the  replacement  value of foreign exchange contracts. Notional values of 
both  foreign exchange and interest rate contracts and replacement  values of interest rate contracts continued to  rise  during the period. 
*Nonperforming assets consist of  nonaccruing loans, accruing loans past due ninety days or  more, restructured loans, and real estate 
acquired through foreclosure. equity, bank holding companies relied chiefly on com- 
mon stock issuance ($9.3 billion) and preferred stock 
issuance  ($5.3  billion).  Most  net  income during  this 
period ($15.6 billion)  was absorbed through dividends 
on common stock  ($10.4 billion)  and preferred stock 
($1.7 billion).  Retained earnings were more important 
for many bank holding companies than the aggregate 
statistics would suggest, however, because other  com- 
panies experienced losses over this period. 
Subordinated debt growth was also strong ($9.8 bil- 
lion); yields on debt securities for many bank holding 
companies fell sharply after  reaching junk bond heights 
in late 1990. Mandatory convertible securities were on 
net retired (—$3.6 billion), a predictable development 
given that  these instruments count only as tier 2 capital 
under the risk-based capital guidelines but had been a 
core  capital component  under the "primary capital 
guidelines" in place  before 1991.  Loan loss reserves 
increased for this sample (which differs substantially 
Footnote 13 continued 
9, 1992. Since bank holding companies in the sample maintain a 
ratio  of assets to equity of  about 16.5, the $10.3 billion in equity 
acquired through mergers could  support up to about $170 billion in 
merger assets before the bank holding companies would have to 
raise additional capital. 
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from the sample analyzed in Table 1), largely owing to 
mergers;  however, virtually  none of the additional 
reserves qualified as tier 2 capital,  because  the 
shrinkage of risk-weighted assets reduced the amount 
of reserves allowable for regulatory capital. 
The distribution of bank holding companies 
across capital adequacy groups 
Applying the capital adequacy definitions  adopted for 
banks in connection with FOICIA, we find that both.the 
number and the asset share of  bank holding companies 
that  would  be  deemed "well  capitalized" have 
increased.14 Chart 1 depicts the change in the distribu- 
tion of bank holding companies and bank holding com- 
pany assets across the three capital  adequacy zones 
'4For simplicity, we have categorized all bank holding companies with 
leverage ratios below 4 percent as undercapitalized, although 
banks and bank holding companies with strong examination ratings 




Changes in Equity and Supplemental  Capital 
Components  between 1990-Ill and 1992-1 
In Billions of Dollars 
Chart  1 
Distribution  of Bank Holding  Companies 
across  Capital Adequacy  Groups 
Percentage share  of  total 
100 
Asset Distribution as  of 
September  30,  1990 
80 
Changes in equity 
Equity acquired through 
business combinations (mergers) 
Net income 
Less dividends on common stock 
Less  dividends on preferred  stock 
Equals retained earnings 
Net issuance of common stock 
Net issuance of  preferred stock 
Other increases in equityt 
Equals  total increase in equityr 
Percentage share  of  total 
100 
Asset Distribution as  of 
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7.5  0 
0.1 
Under-  Adequately  Welt  Under-  Adequately  Welt 
capitalized  capitalized capitalized  capitalized  capitalized capitalized 
Note: Sample is limited to  those 983 bank holding companies 
that liled FR  Y-9C reports for  both  1990-Ill and 1992-I. 
'Increases consist of a  variety of accounting adjustments to 
equity, including foreign  currency translation adjustments, 
cumulative effects of  earlier changes in accounting principles, 
and corrections for past accounting errors. 
tlotat increase differs from the  change in tier  1 capital reported 
in Table  1  by  roughly the  equity acquired through mergers net 
of goodwill. 
§AS of year-end  1992, loan loss reserves  up to a maximum  of 
1.25  percent of risk-weighted assets qualify as  tier 2  capital. 
Notes: Sample  for  1990-Ill  (1  992-I)  consists of 1082 (983) 
bank  holding companies representing $3,003  ($2,965) 
billion in  total assets. Bank  holding companies are 
assigned to capital  adequacy groups  as  follows:  1) well 
capitalized if  tier 1 risk-based capital  ratio  is greater  than 
6  percent, total risk-based capital  ratio  is greater  than 
10  percent, and leverage  ratio  is greater  than 5  percent; 
2)  undercapitalized if  tier  1 risk-based capital  ratio  is less 
than 4  percent, total risk-based capital  ratio  is less  than 
8  percent, or  leverage  ratio  is less than 4  percent; and 
3)  adequately capitalized if  neither  well capitalized nor 
undercapitalized. between September 30, 1990, and March 31, 1992. The 
increasing shares of all  bank holding companies and 
bank holding company assets in the  stronger capitaliza- 
tion groups are quite impressive. In  the beginning of the 
period, 70 percent of all bank holding companies, pos- 
sessing only 30 percent of the assets, were classified 
as well  capitalized, but at the end of the period, these 
percentages rose to 80  percent and 73 percent, respec- 
tively. Moreover,  11  percent of the bank holding compa- 
nies, representing a 28 percent share of the assets, 
were undercapitalized at the start, and these percent- 
ages fell to 7 percent and 5 percent by the end of the 
period. 
Capital ratios have shown strong  improvement  across 
the various capital  adequacy groups, rising for those 
that were initially undercapitalized as well as for those 
that were already well capitalized. Table 3 details the 
movements  of bank holding companies in and out of  the 
three capital  zones over the sample period. Here we 
see that the improved distribution of bank holding com- 
panies across capital  adequacy groups is only partly 
explained by mergers and closings. Of the 111 under- 
capitalized  bank  holding companies observed at the 
beginning of  the period, 33  left the sample by  the end of 
the period. Another  66 of these institutions  became 
adequately or well capitalized over the same period. 
The most striking statistic  in this table, however, is that 
93 of the adequately capitalized bank holding compa- 
nies (with $881 billion in assets) moved into the well- 
capitalized group during  this short sample period. 
Capital adequacy  and asset growth 
Of  the 983 bank holding companies included at  both the 
beginning and the end of our sample, the institutions 
that were well-capitalized as of September 30, 1990, 
had asset growth of 15.5 percent, the adequately cap- 
italized grew  9.9 percent,  and  the undercapitalized 
shrank 10.6 percent.'5 Much of this differential growth 
reflects merger activity. Previous studies  have noted 
that well capitalized  banks have grown  faster  than 
undercapitalized banks over the last few years.16 These 
studies implicitly  support the view that differences in 
capital  ratios  across institutions  have more powerful 
effects on relative asset growth rates in banking than in 
unregulated financial industries.17 
'5Risk-weighted  assets grew more slowly, at a rate about 6 
percentage points less than asset growth for each capital 
adequacy group. 
'6See Ronald Johnson, "The Bank Credit 'Crumble,"  this Quarterly 
Review,  Summer  1991, pp. 40-51; Cara Lown and Ben Bernanke, 
"The Credit Crunch," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
1992:2,  pp. 205-39; Joe Peek and Eric Rosengren, "The Capital 
Crunch in New England," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston New 
England Economic Review,  May-June 1992, pp. 21-31;  and Herbert 
Baer and John McElravey,  "Capital Adequacy and the Growth of 
U.S. Banks," Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper 
Series, no. WP-92-11,  June 1992. 
'7Capital strength, however, is also an important determinant of asset 
growth in unregulated industries. Eli Remolona  and Kurt Wulfekuhler 
have shown that the single most important variable predicting asset 
Table 3 
Detailed Transitions across Risk-based  Capital Groups  between 1990-Ill and 1992-I 
Billions of  Dollars  Percentage of Total 
Well capitalized at 1990-Ill  776  100  1,063  100 
Well capitalized at 1992-I  695  90  971  91 
Adequately capitalized at 1992-I  29  .  4  57  5 
Undercapitalized at 1992-I  4  1  4  0 
Exited sample by 1992-I  48  6  30  3 
Adequately capitalized at 1990-Ill  195  ' 
100  1,185  100 
Well capitalized at 1992-I  93  48  881  74 
Adequately capitalized at 1992-I  63  32  .  154  13 
Undercapitalized at 1992-I  21  11  54  5 
Exited sample by 1992-I  18  9  96  8 
Undercapitalized at 1990-Ill  111  100  755  100 
Well capitalized at 1992-I  34  31  85  11 
Adequately capitalized at 1992-I  32  29  430  57 
Undercapitalized at 1992-I  12  11  128  17 
Exited sample by 1992-I  33  30  112  15 
Notes: Bank holding companies are assigned to  capital groups according to  their risk-based capital as follows:  1) well capitalized if  their 
tier 1 risk-based capital ratios are above 6  percent, total risk-based capital ratios are above 10 percent, and leverage ratios are above 5 
percent; 2) undercapitalized if  their tier 1 risk-based capital ratios are below 4 percent, total risk-based capital  ratios are below 8  percent, 
or  leverage ratios are below 4  percent; and 3) adequately capitalized if  neither well capitalized nor undercapitalized. 
Number  Percentage  of Total 
Bank Holding Companies  Assets as of 1990-Ill 
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capital requirements on relative asset  growth, we esti- 
mated regressions relating asset growth to tier 1 risk- 
based capital ratios and public bond ratings.18 We col- 
lected a sample of eighty-eight bank holding companies 
assigned senior debt ratings by Moody's or Standard 
and Poor's. (When senior debt ratings were unavailable, 
they were inferred from subordinated debt ratings.) A 
second sample was created from the first by dropping 
nine bank holding companies whose assets grew sub- 
stantially through mergers during the sample period. 
The results, presented in Table 4, show that capital 
adequacy has an independent effect on asset growth. 
Both  initial capital ratios and bond  ratings  appear 
strongly correlated with asset growth, particularly when 
the large acquirers are excluded from the  sample. More- 
over, although credit  ratings and capital ratios are them- 
selves correlated  (the magnitude  of each  estimated 
coefficient declines when the other regressor is added 
to the specification),  they have  independent  strong 
effects on asset growth. The  specifications also include 
Footnote 17 continued 
growth for finance companies is the credit rating, which for banking 
organizations tends to be correlated with capital  ratios. See 
Finance Companies, Bank Competition, and Niche Markets," this 
Quarterly Review,  Summer 1992. 
'lResults  obtained from regressions using other measures  of capital 
adequacy were not significantly different from those reported here. 
as regressors changes in the capital ratios and credit 
ratings over the sample period. When both capital ratios 
and credit ratings are included in the regressions, the 
change in credit ratings has a positive and significant 
partial  correlation with asset  growth, but the change in 
the capital  ratio  is not significant. These  results are 
consistent with the idea that initial financial  strength, 
rather than subsequent performance, is the key deter- 
minant of  near-term asset  growth. Since rating agencies 
are often slow to adjust ratings to new  information, 
credit rating downgrades during the sample period may 
have been associated with weak asset growth because 
they were  anticipated  by the affected  bank holding 
companies.19 
Which are more constraining: risk-based ratios or 
leverage  ratio requirements? 
In  aggregate data, we observed a larger improvement  in 
the risk-based capital ratios than in the leverage ratio. 
To understand what type of regulatory pressure  has 
been most effective in prompting bank holding compa- 
nies to increase their  capital strength, we compared the 
difficulty of meeting the different capital  requirements. 
In practice, the three  ratios are highly correlated: bank 
holding companies that have high (low) risk-based cap- 
'9For example, during the sample period, the average credit rating 
fell, although by the end of the period, the average capital ratio 
had risen. 
Table 4 
Relationships among Asset Growth,  Capital Ratios, 
Dependent variable: bank holding company asset growth 
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and Bond Ratings 
1 
Expnatory Variables  Sample 1  .  Sample 2 
Constant  3.70**  29.15"  —8.58  —32.88"  22.56** 
term  (10.13)  (7,25)  (5.94)  (6.17)  (4.77)  (4.66) 










Change in tier  1  1.35  4.03**  —0.23  2.42" 
risk-based ratio  (1,63)  (1.45)  (1.01)  (0.98) 
Initial senior  2.14"  2.42"  1.92"  2.09" 
bond rating  (0.69)  (0.70)  (0.43)  (0.54) 
Increase in senior  2.83'  3.94"  2.76**  354*' 
bond rating  (1.26)  (1.11)  (0.75)  (0.82) 
R2  0.30  0.20  0,22  0.60  0.50  0.30 
Number of  observations  88  88  88  79 
Notes: Standard  errors are given in parentheses below the  coefficient estimates. Bond ratings were converted to numerical  values; high 
ratings correspond to large numbers. Moody's bond  ratings were used in most cases. When  Moody's rafings were not  available, Standard 
and Poor's were used. In  some cases, senior debt  ratings were inferred from subordinated debt  ratings. Sample 1 consists of eighty-eight 
bank holding companies  with debt  ratings by Moody's or Standard  and Poor's. Sample 2  consists of  seventy-nine  bank holding companies 
with debt ratings by  Moody or Standard and Poor's that did not acquire a large  bank holding company between September 30.  1990, and 
March 31. 1992. Changes in asset growth, risk-based ratios, and bond ratings occurred between September 30.  1990, and March 31, 1992. 
'Significantly different from zero at  the 5  percent level. 
"Significantly  different from zero at the  1 percent level, ital ratios tend to have high (low) leverage ratios. 
Comparisons between the risk-based and leverage 
capital requirements are complicated because  the  mini- 
mum leverage requirement varies from one depository 
institution to another.  Broadly speaking, however, 
smaller bank holding companies tend to have higher 
risk-based capital ratios relative to their leverage ratios 
than  do larger  bank holding companies for two reasons: 
1) the small bank holding companies rely more on low- 
risk security holdings as a source of liquidity, and 2) 
large bank holding companies typically  have more off- 
balance-sheet exposures. Small bank holding compa- 
nies tend to satisfy  their  total risk-based capital req  uire- 
ment with tier 1 capital and loan loss reserves because 
the issuance of supplemental capital instruments such 
as subordinated debt or convertible  bonds generally 
involves large fixed costs.2° 
2OAlthough the supplemental capital components of tier 2 capital are 
valued by the regulators (since they serve as a buffer preventing 
losses to the deposit insurance fund), market participants report 
that the credit rating agencies measure capital adequacy almost 
exclusively by tier 1 capital because the agencies are concerned 
with the likelihood of default on all debt instruments. 
Some observers have argued that, in  practice, the lever- 
age requirement is  more constraining  than  the risk- 
based standards. A Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
study shows that asset growth rates of bank holding 
companies  are  more  correlated  with their  leverage 
ratios than with their total risk-based capital  ratios.21 
Another study, published by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston,  argues that the leverage requirement has 
been a particular  impediment to loan growth because 
regulators require higher leverage  ratios  at troubled 
institutions to head off large losses to  the deposit insur- 
ance fund.22 
In contrast to these studies, the evidence presented 
in Table 5 suggests that the leverage ratio requirement 
is slightly less binding than the risk-based standards for 
most bank holding companies. In the  table, the two 
21Herbert  Baer and John McElravey,  "Capital Adequacy and the 
Growth of U.S. Banks,' Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working 
Paper Series, no. WP-92-11,  June 1992. 
Richard  Syron and Richard Randall, 'The Procyclical Application of 
Bank Capital Requirements," Federal Reserve  Bank of Boston, 
Annual Report 1991. 
Table 5 
Risk-based  Capital versus Leverage Capital Adequacy  Groups 
Bank Holding Companies  Assets 
Number  Percentage  of  Total  Billions of  Dollars  Percentage  of  Total 
As  of  September 30, 1990 
All bank holding companies  1,082  100  3.003  100 
Risk-based capital groups 
Well capitalized  776  72  1,063  35 
Adequately capitalized  195  18  1,185  40 
Undercapitalized  111  10  755  25 
Leverage ratio capital groups 
Well  capitalized  927  86  1.723  57 
Adequately capitalized  82  7  903  30 
Undercapitalized  73  7  376  13 
As  of  March 31, 1992 
All bank holding companies  983  100  2,965  100 
Risk-based capital groups 
Well capitalized  800  81  2,205  74 
Adequately capitalized  124  13  613  21 
Undercapitalized  59  6  147  5 
Leverage ratio capital groups 
Well capitalized  877  89  2,432  82 
Adequately capitalized  49  5  389  13 
Undercapitalized  57  6  144  5 
Notes: Sample Consists  of  all bank holding companies  filing  FR  Y-9C reports for 1990-Ill.  Bank holding companies are assigned to  capital 
groups according to their risk-based capital  as  follows: 1) well  capitalized if tier  1 risk-based capital ratio is  greater than 6 percent and total 
risk-based capital  ratio  is  greater than 10 percent: 2) undercapitalized if tier  1 risk-based capital  ratio is less than 4 percent or  total risk- 
based capital ratio  is  less than 8 percent; and 3) adequately capitalized if  neither welt capitalized nor undercapitalized. Bank holding 
companies are assigned to capital groups according to  their tier 1 leverage  ratios as  follows: 1) well  capitalized if  leverage  ratio  is  greater 
than 5 percent; 2) undercapitalized if leverage  ratio is less than 4  percent; and 3) adequately capitalized if  neither well capitalized nor 
undercapitalized. 
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butions of bank holding companies among the three 
capital adequacy zones. At both the beginning and end 
of the sample period, the leverage standard appears 
modestly more  generous than  the risk-based capital 
ratio standard. That is, a greater number of bank hold- 
ing companies, with greater assets, would be classified 
as undercapitalized if the risk-based capital ratio rather 
than the leverage ratio were the sole standard. 
Two factors help to explain the difference between 
this finding and the conclusions reached in earlier stud- 
ies. First, although other studies show that  bank holding 
company asset growth rates are more correlated with 
leverage ratios than with total risk-based capital ratios, 
they do not examine the ability of variations in tier 1 
risk-based capital ratios to explain differences in asset 
growth.23 Second, desired risk-based capital ratios may 
have increased relative to desired leverage ratios since 
the adoption of  an explicit regulatory definition of a  well- 
capitalized bank. Because the effective minimum lever- 
age ratio requirement in place over the last three years 
was 4 to 5 percent for most banks, the recent require- 
ment that well-capitalized banks maintain a  leverage 
ratio in excess of 5 percent is relatively easy to achieve. 
In contrast, the tier 1  and total risk-based capital mini- 
mum requirements of 4 percent and 8 percent, respec- 
tively,  are  substantially  less  than  the new  well- 
capitalized  standards of 6 percent and  10 percent, 
respectively. 
The results of a recent survey support the view  that 
for most  institutions,  desired  leverage ratios are not 
more constraining  than  desired  risk-based  ratios.  In 
August 1992, fifty-nine large U.S. banks with combined 
assets of almost $1 trillion were asked to respond to the 
following question on capital adequacy: 
Taking  into  account regulatory requirements, 
expected loan demand, the quality of loans and 
other  assets in your bank's portfolio, and its pros- 
pects for earnings and raising new capital, your 
bank's current risk-based capita' ratio and tier 1 
leverage ratio could best be described as 1) very 
comfortable, 2) fairly comfortable, 3) about ade- 
quate, 4) fairly tight, or 5) very  tight.24 
The banks' responses are strikingly consistent for the 
two capital requirements: 
Risk-based Capital 
Ratio  Leverage  Ratio 
Number  Percent  Number  Percent 
of Banks  of  Total  of Banks  of  Total 
28  47.5  28  47.5 
23  39.0  23  39.0 
5  8.5  6  10.2 
0  0.0  1  1.7 
3  5.1  1  1.7 
Thus, banks themselves have professed a very similar 
degree of comfort with their risk-based capital  ratios 
and their leverage capital ratios. 
Stock market rewards for capital ratio 
improvements 
The remainder of this article analyzes how the stock 
market has reacted to changes in bank holding com- 
pany capital ratios. We find that bank holding compa- 
nies  that improved their capital  ratios experienced 
above-average  stock price appreciations, particularly if 
they were weakly capitalized at the  beginning of the 
sample  and became well capitalized by the end. 
Assuming that this appreciation reflects more than  a 
stock market response to strong earnings, the question 
arises,  Why  has the stock  market  been  rewarding 
reductions in  leverage at this time?  We  explore this 
question  by considering  the theoretical relationship 
between stock prices and changes in capital structure 
and by analyzing in  detail  the  correlation between stock 
prices and capital ratio improvements in our sample. 
Finally, we  examine how stock  market rewards have 
varied with the different strategies employed by bank 
holding companies to improve their capital ratios. 
The theoretical relationship between changes in 
capital ratios and stock prices 
A substantial portion of both theoretical and empirical 
research  in finance is  devoted  to the relationship 
between stock prices and firm capital structures. The 
standard analytical framework begins with an idealized 
model that excludes taxes, bankruptcy costs, and the 
agency costs arising  from differential information 
between investors and firm managers. In this setting, 
managerial  decisions  regarding  changes  in capital 
structure have no effect on stock prices, except that 
changes in equity  due to common stock dividends have 
a dollar-for-dollar effect on the value of common 
shares.25 By contrast, models that incorporate taxes, 
The pioneering paper in this area is Franco Modigliani and Merton 
Miller, 'The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the  Theory of 
Investment," American Economic Review.  vol. 48 (June 1985). 
pp. 261-97. 
Choices 





Tier  1  risk-based capital ratios are, of course, more highly 
correlated with leverage ratios than are total risk-based capital 
ratios. We found very little difference between the choice of the 
tier 1 risk-based capital ratio and the leverage ratio in regressions 
(not reported here) relating capital  ratios to asset growth rates. 
See the "Senior Loan Officer Survey on Bank Lending Practices," 
Board of Governors  01 the Federal Reserve  System,  August 1992. 
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of a theoretically optimal capital ratio for each firm; in 
this  framework, the financial decisions made by manag- 
ers can affect stock  prices.26 Firms limit their use of 
debt because the marginal cost of  borrowed funds is  an 
increasing function of leverage. 
Factors  other than taxes, bankruptcy  costs,  and 
agency costs may also be important in the determina- 
tion of the desired capital structure of regulated firms 
and,  in  particular,  bank  holding  companies.27  Banks 
with liabilities consisting entirely of government-insured 
deposits have funding  costs that  are independent of 
their capital structures. Such institutions might therefore 
desire to operate at the minimum capital ratios permit- 
ted by their regulators. Under these circumstances, an 
increase  in a bank  holding  company's capital  ratio 
above the required minimum might cause its stock price 
to decline (unless the decline in leverage was due to a 
rise  in  equity  from  surprisingly  strong  earnings).  In 
practice, however, bank holding companies are funded 
in part  by uninsured liabilities,  so  the desire to  drive  capital 
ratios down to their regulatory  minimums  is not absolute. 
The finance literature suggests  that,  other things 
being equal, changes in capital structure that have not 
already been anticipated by the market and that move 
firms toward their optimal capital ratios should lead to 
stock price appreciations. In fact, however, one cannot 
predict unambiguously the algebraic sign of  the change 
in stock  prices following  increases  in  capital  ratios 
because many firms are likely to be above and many 
are likely to be below their optimal capital ratios. More- 
over, some changes in capital ratios are anticipated by 
the market, others are not. 
The  current environment does suggest, however, that 
capital ratio improvements at bank holding companies 
might on  average be  rewarded by the  stock  market. 
Following a period of widespread weak earnings that 
eroded capital in 1989 and 1990, many bank holding 
companies presumably fell below their desired capital 
ratios. Yet over the past two years many of these com- 
panies have  needed a reasonably high  capital  ratio 
2SFor a discussion of the role of taxes in determining the optimal 
capital structure, see Merton Miller. "Debt  and Taxes.  Journal of 
Finance, vol. 32 (May 1977), pp. 261-76. The relationship between 
agency costs and optimal capital structure is developed in Michael 
Jenson and William Meckling, "Theory 01 Ihe Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior.  Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of 
Financial Economics,  vol. 3 (October  1976), pp. 305-60: and in  Stewart 
Myers and Nicholas Majiluf, "Corporate  Financing and Investment 
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have," 
Journal of  Financial Economics, vol. 13 (June 1984). pp. 187.221. 
2The determinants of desired capital ratios for bank holding 
companies and nonfinancial firms are compared in Larry Wall and 
Pamela Peterson, "Valuation Effects of New Capital Issues by Large 
Bank Holding Companies." Journal of Financial Services. vol. 5 
(March 1991). pp.77-87. 
to take on certain high-return investment projects such 
as (1)  financing  future  credit expansion,. (2) taking 
advantage  of the acquisition opportunities posed by the 
current period of industry  consolidation, (3) entering 
new business lines requiring regulatory approval, and 
(4)  competing  in  the growing  markets for swaps or 
credit guarantees, for which strong credit ratings are a 
prerequisite.2° In addition,  FDICIA, adopted  in  1991, 
contains powerful incentives for banks to become well 
capitalized through its provisions relating to risk-based 
deposit insurance  premiums, access to  brokered depos- 
its,  and  capital  ratio  "tripwires"  prompting corrective 
regulatory actions. 
The particular strategies employed by bank holding 
companies to boost their capital ratios may have inci- 
dental effects that alter the expected impact on stock 
prices, as the following examples suggest: 
—A rise in the capital ratio due to earnings growth 
would likely raise stock prices if  earnings were stronger 
than  previously expected and if the market  did not 
expect the gains to be reversed by future losses. 
—A rise due to a suspension of dividend payouts 
might depress prices if the change in dividend policy 
were viewed by the market as a signal of weak future 
earnings. 
—An increase stemming from direct equity issuance 
would probably depress stock prices, perhaps because 
earnings would be diluted or because the market would 
believe that firm  managers issued equity only when 
their stock was overvalued.29 
—An  increase  achieved  through  asset shrinkage 
might depress  prices if the market  interpreted  this 
action as a negative signal of future earnings. 
The  existing literature has little  to say about changes in 
capital structure that occur in  the process of growing or 
shrinking assets because the standard analysis takes 
the level of assets to be funded as given. 
In summary, it appears likely that many bank holding 
companies were below their  target  capital ratios in 1990 
and 1991. Recent earnings performance was poor  and 
new regulatory incentives were pushing target ratios 
upward. Hence, on average, increases in capital ratios 
that were not  already anticipated by the market ought to 
have led to higher stock prices in 1992. The different 
methods of achieving capital ratio improvements, how- 
ever, were  likely to have been  rewarded differently 
2IBank holding companies can engage in these activities through 
highly rated, welt-capitalized subsidiaries, but the need to 
segregate capital br these purposes reduces its availabilily to 
other parts of the organization. 
See. for example. Paul Asquith and David Mullins, "Equity Issues 
and Offering Dilution," Journal of  Financial Economics, vol. 15 
(January-February  1986).  pp. 61-89. 
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probably  have been the most generously  rewarded, 
since  strong  current earnings would signal strong future 
earnings. It is more difficult, however, to predict how the 
stock market would have responded to other ways of 
improving capital ratios—reductions  in dividend 
payouts, stock issuance, and asset shrinkage. 
Empirical  results 
The correlation between stock price appreciation and 
the capital  ratio  in our sample was strong, and  the 
relationship was the strongest for those institutions that 
improved their standings as measured by the capital 
adequacy zones. Chart 2 and Table 6 present stock 
price data for a sample.of 281 bank holding companies, 
which together accounted for $2.4 trillion in assets as of 
March 31, 1992.° The average stock price appreciation 
3°Bank holding companies that were known to be merger targets by 
the end of the period are not included in the sample. 
Bank  holding companies 
that  moved  into a  lower 
capital  adequacy group  I 
between September 30, 1990, and May 15, 1992, was 
62 percent.31 In the table, bank holding companies are 
divided into categories on the basis of their initial cap- 
ital adequacy groups and their subsequent record in 
improving, worsening, or maintaining their  group stand- 
ing over the period. 
The  stock market clearly rewarded those bank hold- 
ing companies that substantially improved their capital 
ratios.32  As Chart 2  shows,  those  institutions  that 
improved their capital  adequacy  standing  averaged 
stock price growth in excess of 100  percent, while those 
that slipped in ranking averaged slightly negative stock 
price performance. Table 6 provides additional insights, 
including the observation that bank holding companies 
that rose to the well-capitalized group were able to do 
so while still expanding assets. 
Bank  holding companies that  were initially  weakly 
capitalized were rewarded more by  the stock market for 
capital ratio improvements  than were bank holding  com- 
panies that  were initially well capitalized. Table  7  details 
the correlations between stock  price growth and 
increases in the various capital ratios. A 1  percentage 
point increase in the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio led to 
an  increase of almost 25 percent in stock prices for 
weakly capitalized bank holding companies, whereas 
well-capitalized institutions experienced only a 7 per- 
cent increase for the same increase in capital.33 The 
stock prices of weakly capitalized bank holding compa- 
nies also  responded more  to  increases in  their  total risk- 
based ratios and their leverage ratios than did well- 
capitalized institutions.  Changes  in capital  ratios 
explain much of the  variation in stock price appreciation 
for weakly capitalized  bank  holding  companies  but 
explain  little for well-capitalized  institutions;  the "A- 
squares" reported in  the  Table 7 regressions  are high for 
the former and extremely low for the latter. 
We examine next whether the stock price response 
varies with the strategy  employed by the bank holding 
3'Stock price data were made available to us by the staff of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve  System. We chose 
May 15 as the ending date because end-of-quarter financial state- 
ments are normally made available  to the public within forty-five  days. 
32This statement assumes that causality runs from capital  ratio 
improvement  to stock prices, and not vice versa. Although it is not 
unusual for firms to issue more common stock after large stock 
price appreciations, that relationship does not appear very strong 
in our data set. (See the discussion of Table 9 below.) 
33Many specifications were tried for the regressions reported in 
Tables 7, 8, and 9. Some of the explanatory variables used—in 
particular, changes in earnings, growth in loan loss reserves, and 
growth in nonperforming assets—had coefficient estimates that 
were economically sensible and significant. The estimated 
coefficients on capital and assets were, however, not sensitive to 
the inclusion or exclusion of these addilional variables. For ease of 
exposition, therefore, we have not reported the estimates from these 
other regressions. 
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Chart  2 
Average Stock Price  Appreciation and Movement 
of  Bank  Holding  Companies acrosS Capital 
Adequacy  Groups 
Bank  holding  companies 
that  moved into a  higher 
capital  adequacy group. 
Percent 
120  — 
100  — 




0  _______________ 
Bank  holding  companies 
that remained in  the same 
capital  adequacy group 
-20 
Notes:  Sample consists of  281 bank  holding companies that 
met  the  following three criteria:  1) company had filed FR  Y-9C 
reports, including details  on risk-weighted assets, on 
September 30,  1990, and March  31,  1992  2)  company had not 
been a known  merger  target  before May 15, 1992;  3) company's 
stock  price data  were  available. Movement in capital  adequacy 
groups  occurred between  September 30, 1990, and 
March  31, 1992. Stock  price  appreciation  occurred between 
September  30,  1990, and May 15, 1992. Table 6 
Stock Price Appreciation by Capital  Adequacy  Groups 
From  September 30. 1990. to  May 15. 1992 
_________________________________  -  ——  —  -—-———  -- 
Average Stock  Number of  Asset Growth  From 
Capital Group  Capital Group  Price Growth  Bank Holding  Assets as  of 1992-I  1990-Ill to 1992-I' 
as  011990.111  as of 1992-I  (Percent)  Companies  (Billions 01 Dollars)  (Percent) 
Well capitalized 
Well capitalized  65  174  694  16.2 
Adequately capitalized  24  14  61  14.8 
Undercapitalized  —45  1  3  —12.7 
Adequately capitalized 
Well capitalized  106  39  887  13.9 
Adequately capitalized  43  22  179  4.3 
Undercapitalized  —31  11  27  —13.5 
Undercapitalized 
Well capitalized  92  5  151  9.4 
Adequately capitalized  92  10  389  —2.3 
Undercapitalized  —35  5  19  —16.3 
Totals  62  281  2,410  12.3 
Note: Sample Consists  of 281 bank holding companies that met the lotlowing three criteria: 1) company  had filed FR  V-9C reports, including 
risk-weighted assets, on September 30. 1990,  and March 31, 1992: 2) company  had not been a known merger target before May 15. 1992: 
and 3) company's stock price data  were available. Bank holding companies  are assigned to  capital groups according to  their  risk-based 
capital  as  follows: 1) well capitalized if their tier  1 risk-based capital ratios are above  6 percent, total risk-based capital  ratios are above 10 
percent, and leverage ratios are above 5 percent: 2) undercapitalized it  their tier  1 risk-based capital ratios are below 4 percent, total risk 
based capital ratios are below 8 percent, or leverage ratios are below 4 percent: and 3) adequately capitalized if  neither well  capitalized 
nor undercapitalized. 
iThe high average asset growth is  due to merger activity. 
Table 7 
Relationship between Stock Price Appreciation and Changes in Capital Ratios 










Constant  45.1  40.5  60.5  57.6  58.2  61.3 
term  (7.0)  (7.0)  (6.7)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.1) 





(1,8)  . 












A2  0.39  0.41  0.35  0.04  0.04  0.07 
Number of observalions  92  92  92  189  189  189 
Notes: All variables are measured in percentage points. All coellicient estimates are  significantly different from  zero at the 1 percent level 
(standard errors are given in parentheses).  The weakly  capitalized sample comprises undercapitalized institutions (tier  1 risk-based capital, 
ratios below 4 percent. total risk-based capital ratios below 8  percent. or leverage ratios below 4 percent) and adequately capitalized 
institutions (defined as  neither well capitalized nor undercapitalized).  The well-capitalized sample comprises institutions with tier  1  risk- 
based capital  ratios above 6 percent, total risk-based capital ratios above 10 percent. and leverage  ratios above 5 percent. The 
capitalization groups  are based on capital ratios as  of  September  30, 1990.  Stock price growth occurred between September  30. 1990.  and 
May 15. 1992. Changes in capital ratios occurred between September  30. 1990. and March 31. 1992. 
Significantly different from zero at  the 5  percent level. 
"Significantly different from zero at  the  1 percent level. 
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compare the stock price response to an increase in the 
numerator of the ratio,  capital,  with  the stock  price 
response to a decrease in the denominator,  assets. For 
simplicity, we limit the analysis to factors affecting the 
tier 1  capital  ratio.34 We then examine whether stock 
prices respond differently to changes in risk-weighted 
assets  than to changes  in total assets.  Finally, we 
decompose the change in  capital into  its various 
sources—net earnings, dividends, stock issuance, and 
equity acquired through mergers. 
The estimated coefficients from the regressions 
reported in the first and third columns of  Table 8 reveal 
the responsiveness of stock prices to growth in tier  1 
capital and  risk-weighted  assets.  Both  weakly  cap- 
italized  and well-capitalized  bank  holding companies 
experienced large stock price increases as their tier 1 
capital rose, although the increase was almost twice  as 
large for the weakly capitalized institutions. The stock 
price  increase  following  a reduction in risk-weighted 
assets was also very strong (although slightly  less than 
the increase following a capital  increase) for weakly 
capitalized bank holding companies. Asset shrinkage 
34We also compared the stock market responses 10 growth in risk- 
weighted assets and growth in total assets and found no material 
differences; therefore, the analysis applies  to the leverage ratio as 
well as the tier 1 risk-based ratio. Furthermore,  we did not uncover 
any systematic relationships in the data between stock prices and 
growth in the supplemental capital components included in tier 2 
capital. 
•  Table 8 
Relationship  between Stock Price Appreciation  and 
Dependent variable: bank holding company stock  price growth 
•  Sample:  Weakly 
•  Capitalized 
Explanatory Variables  Bank Holding Companies 
Constant 
term 
Growth in tier  1 
risk-based capital 




was also rewarded,  but less strongly, for well-capitalized 
institutions. 
Columns two and four of Table 8 reveal the respon- 
siveness of stock prices to growth in tier  1 capital, risk- 
weighted assets, and total assets for weakly capitalized 
and well-capitalized bank holding companies, respec- 
tively.  For both capital adequacy groups, the estimated 
response to the capital growth was basically the same 
as that reported in columns one and three when risk- 
weighted assets but not total assets were included in 
the regressions.  Moreover,  for both  groups,  the 
responses of stock  prices to total growth in risk- 
weighted assets and total assets were about equal in 
size and sum to  the  coefficients on risk-weighted assets 
reported in  the regressions in columns one and three. It 
appears that the stock market did  not  differentiate 
between reductions in risk-weighted assets  and total 
assets.35 
Table 9 focuses on the returns to different strategies 
for  increasing tier  1  capital.  Regressions for weakly 
capitalized and well-capitalized firms are presented in 
columns one and two, respectively.  The first regression 
reported in the upper half of the table  relates stock 
35We feared that merger activity might be driving some of these 
results since acquirers were likely to experience large increases in 
capital, total assets, and risk-weighted assets. We therefore reran 
the regressions underlying Table 7 after dropping the fifty-nine bank 
holding companies that reported merger activity in their equity 
flows.  We found no significant differences in the results. 1 
Sample: Well-Capitalized 
Bank Holding Companies 
50.96"  58.21 
(4.94)  (5.17) 
1.29**  1.50** 
(0.26)  (0.30) 
_0.57*  —0.36 
(0.26)  (0.26) 
—0.44 
(0.31) 
0.11  0.12 















R2  0.35  0.38 
Number of observations  92  92  189  189 
•  Notes: All variables are measured  in percentage points. All coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at  the  1 percent level 
(standard errors are given in parentheses).  The weakly  capitalized sample comprises undercapitalized institutions (tier 1 risk-based capital. 
ratios below 4  percent, total risk-based capital ratios below 8  percent, or leverage r-alios below 4  percent) and adequately capitalized 
institutions (defined as  neither well capitalized nor undercapitalized). The well-capitalized sample comprises institutions with tier  1 risk- 
based capital ratios above 6  percent, total risk-based capital ratios above 10 percent, and leverage  ratios above 5  percent. The 
capitalization groups are based on capital  ratios as  of  September 30, 1990.  Stock price growth occurred between September 30. 1990,  and 
•  May 15, 1992. Growth  in capital and assets occurred between September  30,  1990,  and Match 31, 1992. 
*significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
**Significantly  different from zero at the  1 percent level. 
22  FRBNY Quarterly Review/Autumn 1992 price  appreciation to risk-weighted asset growth and 
two variables that in combination sum to tier 1  capital 
growth—that is, tier  1 capital growth due to net earnings 
(less preferred stock dividends) and all other sources of 
tier  1 capital growth. The estimated coefficient on cap- 
ital growth through earnings was large and significant 
for both groups. Other contributions to capital growth 
were also  rewarded by the market, but the  absolute 
magnitude of  the stock price response was considerably 
less than the response to  earnings for both groups. The 
stock market responded more favorably to strong earn- 
ings (and negatively to weak earnings) because earn- 
ings not only raised current capital levels but may also 
have signaled long-run improvements in profitability. 
In the second regression reported in the lower part of 
the table, the growth in tier 1  capital is further decom- 
posed. Here we see that the stock market responded 
positively to efforts  by both  groups to build capital 
through  stock  issuance  and  dividend  cutbacks, 
although rewards were somewhat greater for well-cap- 
italized bank holding  companies  than weakly cap- 
italized institutions. In addition, for both groups, capital 
















































Relationships between  Stock Price Appreciation 
and Growth Rates of Assets and Capital  Components 
Dependent variable: bank holding company stock price  growth 
Sample: Weakly Capitalized  Sample: Welt-Capitalized 





Contribution to  tier 1 capital growth 
from  net  earnings alter preferred  dividends 
Contributions to  tier 1 capital growth 
from all other factors 




Contribution to tier  1  capital growth 
from net earnings after preferred dividends 
Contribution to  tier 1  capital growth 
from common stock  issuance 
Tier 1  capital growth 
trom preferred stock  issuance 
Contribution to  tier 1 capital growth 
from common stock  dividends 
Contribution to  tier 1 capital growth 
from business combinations (mergers) 
Growth in risk-weighted assets 
A2 





Notes: All variables are measured  in percentage points. All coefficient estimates  are significantly diflerent.from zero at  the  1 percent level 
(standard errors are given in parentheses).  The weakly capitalized sample comprises  undercapitalized institutions (tier 1 risk-based capital. 
ratios below 4  percent, total risk-based capital ratios below 8 percent, or leverage ratios below 4 percent) and adequately capitalized 
institutions (defined as neither well capitalized nor undercapitalized). The well-capitalized sample comprises institutions with tier  1 risk- 
based capital ratios above 6  percent, total risk-based capital ratios above 10 percent, and ieverage  ratios above 5  percent. The 
capitalization groups are based on capital ratios as  of  September  30, 1990. Stock price growth occurred between September 30, 1990,  and 
May 15, 1990. Growth in capital components and assets occurred between September  30, 1990,  and March 31, 1992. 
'Significantly different from zero at  the 5 percent level. 
"Significantly  different from  zero at  the  1 percent level. 
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The strength of the U.S. banking  system has been 
improving as bank holding companies strive to become 
well capitalized. Regulatory  pressure has probably  been 
the principal force propelling these efforts, but private 
incentives have also played a role. Bank holding com- 
panies,  motivated in  part by the  strategic  business 
opportunities  available to institutions  with  capital  to 
invest, have been moving to repair their balance sheets 
following a period of weak earnings. The  markets have 
clearly rewarded reductions in leverage, but the prefer- 
ence for higher capital ratios is not without limit: the 
rewards for capital ratio improvements are significantly 
less for bank holding companies that are already well 
capitalized than for weakly capitalized institutions. 
The stock market has assigned different rewards to 
the different strategies  employed to improve capital 
ratios. For well-capitalized institutions, stock price 
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increases were proportionately larger for increases in 
capital than for shrinkage in assets. For weakly capi- 
talized institutions,  however, the stock market made little 
distinction between  the capital ratio improvements 
achieved through capital growth and the improvements 
achieved through asset reduction. For all institutions, 
the price  responses to reductions  in  risk-weighted 
assets and reductions in total assets were about the 
same, perhaps because the leverage ratio and  risk- 
based capital ratios appear to be about equally con- 
straining for  most  bank  holding  companies.  Of the 
means of raising capital, increased  earnings yielded the 
largest stock price increases. Dividend retention and 
stock issuance, methods of raising capital that financial 
officers often fear will depress stock prices, were in fact 
correlated in our  sample with stock  price  increases. 
This finding underscores the market's enthusiasm for all 
forms of capital ratio improvement in recent quarters. 